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Abstract
This paper explores theoretically and empirically the link between Financial Lib-
eralization (FL) and the banking crisis that often follow. We also investigate the
proposition, classical in development economics, that FL should result in an increase
in supply of funds to the real sector. To accomplish this we …rst develop a theoretical
model of a banking …rm that operates under …nancial repression and is then subject
to FL. The model yields the result that following FL there is an unambiguous increase
in risk to the banking …rm which implies a higher probability of a banking crisis fol-
lowing FL. Less formally, we also conclude that the presence of a explicit or implict
deposit insurance scheme is likely to accentuate the incentives to engage in risk and
the risk structure of the banking system. Moral hazard plays an important role in
this increase in risk to the banking sector. This questions the ”innocence” of the
bank owners in the crisis that have often followed FL and that had been attributed
to either macroeconomic policy, concomitant structural changes in the economy or
left-over distortions from the …nancial repression period. The sign of the change in
supply of credit to the real sector, however, is ambiguous.
Then we test empirically the propositions resulting from this model using data
of 73 banks (some of which may have become technically insolvent) from Greece,
Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand. The empirical test was based on a system
of three simultaneous equations that use a measure of risk, pro…tability and inter-
mediation as dependent variables. The measure of risk used was the conditional
variance estimated using an empirical conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model esti-
mated using an EGARCH speci…cation. The tests tend to support the conclusions of
the theoretical model, i.e. unambiguous increase in risk and, for the sample used, an
unambiguous fall in loan supply as a proportion of funds available. Finally we draw
policy implication with respect to bank supervision, forbearance and bank failure
resolution procedures during the transition period, and about the so-called ”liberal-
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Mark Twain once said that Adam was the only man who could safely assume to
say something with the assurance that he was the …rst man on earth to say it.
When it comes to …nancial liberalization, the late Diaz-Alejandro [16] with his famous
article ”Good-bye Financial Liberalization, Hello Financial Crash!” was perhaps
not the …rst, but certainly the clearest and loudest in warning against the dangers
associated with …nancial liberalization (FL).1 More than ten years later, as Diaz-
Alejandro warned, more often than not, throwing out …nancial repression still invites
a major …nancial-system crisis. In fact, before that time and since, two out of three
members of the International Monetary Fund have experienced a major banking crisis
with losses in excess of 250 billion dollars [34] and over 130 countries, comprising
three-fourth of the IMF’s members have experienced ”signi…cant” banking sector
problems [54]. A very high share of these crisis occurred following deregulation of
their …nancial markets and the banking system. Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Finland,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Venezuela and even
the United States (with the S&LA debacle shortly after DIDMCA2) are just some
examples of major banking crisis that follow on the heels of deregulation. Even the
banking system of Thailand, following one of the most carefully manicured FL in
the developing world, is showing the typical symptoms of FL cum …nancial crisis.
Kaminsky and Reinhart [41] report that in18 out of 25 banking crisis surveyed by
them, the …nancial sector had been liberalized some time during the previous …ve
years. Latin American countries have staged in the mid 1990’s a even more expensive
”encore” of the drama of the early 1980’s that was at the center of Diaz-Alejandro’s
attention with new banking crisis of enormous proportions.3.
The symptoms are typical: following FL and after some time has elapsed, rapid
growth of banking assets, large increases in interest rates, rapid deterioration in the
quality of the loan portfolio, often undercapitalization of banks and, if the rules of the
game allow it, excessive lending to bank-a¢liated companies and then, failures. Then
come the rescue measures: introduction of a government funded deposit insurance
scheme, creation of body to handle rescue operations, injection of capital, etc., most
likely preventing liquidation of banks by all means, all resulting in a huge transfer of
1We de…ne ”…nancial liberalization” in a very narrow sense: elimination of government controls
on interest rates (deposit and/or lending) and credit allocation. We will be more speci…c in section
2 of this paper.
2Depository Instituttions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.
3See for example Arnaudo [4] for a comparison of the Argentine crisis of 1980 and 1995.
1resources from the economy to the …nancial sector. To cap all that, governments are
most likely accused by the non-failing banks of indecision in handling the crisis, thus
encouraging a run on those institutions and perhaps capital ‡ight.
This is, of course, not what FL was supposed to do. The substantial body of
economic literature that supports the drive toward market based price and allocation
of …nancial resources, rests on the idea that FL will improve allocation of …nancial
resources, promote savings and increase the overall supply of credit to the real sector.
More speci…cally, according to this theory FL should have the e¤ect of increasing
deposit rates, thus increasing the supply of savings to the …nancial sector. This
increase of supply of savings results in an equivalent increase in the supply of loans
to the real sector, without changing the rates on loans. This is achieved by reducing
reserve requirements on the banking sector that transfers the savings to borrowers by
holding lending rates constant (Fry, [20]) and makes the funds available for …nancing
the real sector. That is, the expansion of credit to the real sector has two sources:
…rst, an increase in the savings rate by investors that is captured by the banking
system; second, a shift of portfolio allocation by the banks, mostly from reserves
to real sector lending. The supposed outcome is an increase in level and e¢ciency
of sustained economic growth. To our knowledge the separation between these two
e¤ects has not been empirically investigated.
While there appears to exist a reasonable agreement that a deepening of the
…nancial system accompanied by the creation of new instruments and institutions is
indeed de long-term e¤ect of a FL process, the short term e¤ects should rightfully
be put under scrutiny. If there are a few success stories, i.e. FL processes that have
been implemented leading to a smooth transition in the …nancial system, too many
are not. In the latter cases, FL led to a crisis in the …nancial system accompanied
with a severe slow-down in growth or contraction of the GNP.
Most authors, while attempting to explain the banking crisis, invoke a number of
di¤erent reasons and resist to establish (or choose to ignore) an explicit link between
FL and the banking crisis that follows. In some cases, the link has been more or
less emphatically rejected (Sundararajan and Baliño [68]: ”it’s unfair to say that
liberalization causes the crises ”).4 In most cases the crisis is attributed to:
² macroeconomic factors or wrong government …scal and monetary policies;
² FL occurs with other structural changes that are at the root of the crisis;
² the crisis following the FL is nothing else than the process of ”shaking out”
misallocation of resources that had been made under the FR regime.
In most cases a direct responsibility of the bankig system is either ignored or
rejected. Chan et al [8] put it in somewhat dramatic but clear terms: ”Sometimes the
4However, in the case of Chile, there appear to exist an ”increasing consensus ” that the crisis
that followed the FL, described as the worse since the 1930’s , was due to ”errors committed by the
banking system ” that were made possible or even encouraged by the FL process (see Cortes-Douglas
[14]). IMF research (e.g. [54] and [67]) and discours (e.g. [10]) is also giving a higher importance to
the microeconomic roots of bankig sector problems in the context of FL.
2story is cast in terms of crisis in government, i.e. spendthrift …scal policy or politicized
and/or irresolute monetary policy. The commonality in all these explanations is their
anecdotal quality and the implied innocence of the banks.”
Another issue that is relevant is whether the supply of credit to the productive
sector increases following FL. As noted before, the traditional literature predicts that
the increase in funds being attracted by the banking system following the deregulation
of interest rates, should be passed on to the productive sector (at similar rates to
those preceding FL). This increase in credit, combined with the higher e¢ciency of
allocation of funds to higher-quality projects is, of course, at the center of all motives
for liberalizing the …nancial system. The model we will present allows us to evaluate
the incentives banks face following FL regarding the supply of credit to potential
borrowers.
Thus, in this paper we explicitly explore, theoretically and empirically, the link
between FL, the banking crisis that sometimes ensue and the changes observed in the
supply of credit to the real sector. To accomplish this we …rst develop a theoretical
model of a banking …rm that operates under …nancial repression and is then subject
to FL. Then we test empirically the propositions resulting from this model using
data of banks (some of which may have become technically insolvent) from Greece,
Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand.5 The model also allows us to ”explain ”
some of the earlier empirical results presented in the literature.
The result suggest that following FL there is an unambiguous increase in risk to
the banking …rm. This is so even if abstraction is made of concomitant structural
changes or left-over distortions from the FR period. These other sources of risk only
complicate the picture further. Because this increase in risk is across-the-board it
implies a higher systemic risk and probability of a banking crisis following FL. The
sign of the change in supply of credit to the real sector, however, is ambiguous. Both
these results are supported by the theoretical model and empirical tests. That is FL
increases unambiguously the fragility of the banking system and thus the probability
of banking failures or a system-wide banking crisis. In this sense it is perhaps ”fair
to say that liberalization does cause the crisis” that often follow. Further, we show
that moral hazard plays a role in this increase in risk to the banking sector thus
questioning the ”innocence” of the banks in the crisis that have often followed FL.
A similar problem was studied by Lam and Chen [53] for the case of the United
States. They focused on elimination of Regulation Q (ceilings on deposits) and the
imposition of more stringent capital requirements. This is of interest in our context
too, because latter FL processes have often been accompanied by imposition of BIS
5With the exception of Mexico, the sample of countries used biases the results against us. The
other countries in the sample have experienced FL processes that have been extremely carefully and
prudently managed and have not produced a banking crisis. Further, even in the carefully manicured
case of FL in Thailand, the banking system and investment companies are going through a property
based crisis, only seven years after the start, in 1990, of a gradual FL. Our selection of countries was
based predominantly on the availability of accounting and stock market data for the banks. It is
nonetheless interesting to investigate whether FL produces the e¤ects predicted in the model, even
though they may not go to the extreme of producing a system wide banking crisis. Malaysia, did
su¤er a banking crisis following its early and mild FL attempt (reversed shortly after) of the late
1970’s.
3capital standards (e.g. Mexico, Thailand, etc.) that are substantially more stringent
than those that existed before. They …nd that under Regulation Q, an increase in
capital requirements encourages unambiguously a shift towards more risky projects.
A similar result under liberalized interest rates, would mean that the bank safety
gains obtained from imposition of more stringent capital standards may have been
cancelled by the incentive to take up more risk. This is not unambiguously the case,
as the authors …nd that the directional e¤ect of the partial derivatives cannot be
determined in their model. However, they conclude that it is ”possible” that in an
environment of free interest rates, a more stringent capital requirement can induce
the bank to shift more of its resources to projects with higher risk.6 These …ndings
provide further support to the results we mention in the previous paragraph and that
will be presented below.
The line of arguments presented in this paper could be understood as contribut-
ing to the theory of systemic risk and …nancial crisis. The literature on the sub-
ject provides eight distinguishable theories of …nancial crisis namely: excessive debt
accumulation; bank panics;speculative bubbles attributable to rational expectations;
sudden credit rationing; asymmetric information; vulnerability associated with dealer
markets and excessive competition due to deregulation and the erosion of entry bar-
riers (see [5] for details). The explanation of increased systemic risk and …nancial
crisis provided in this paper does not fall squarely into any of these categories but is
related to several of them, mostly to the theories based on credit rationing [33] and
competition due to deregulation and the erosion of entry barriers [15].
The study has important policy implications regarding both the motivation of
FL and the way these are managed. Banking sector solvency problems appears to
be a wrong reason for liberalizing the banking sector, since this liberalization will
only exacerbate fragility and the probability of a system-wide crisis. The results
also suggest that it is essential that …nancial liberalization be accompanied by a
strengthening of the supervision and monitoring of the banking system. In particular,
the supervision and monitoring authorities should have in place a stringent system of
identi…cation of failure prone banks and a credible bank failure resolution policy. In
fact, this increase in supervision capacity should, if possible, precede initiation of the
FL process. We draw more detailed policy implications in the conclusions section.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we develop the
model and elaborate on the predictions that this model generates. We will focus on
two issues: one is associated to risk exposure and risk taking by banks following FL;
the second is about the supply of credit by the banking system to the real sector of
the economy. In section 3 we present the statistical model, in section 4 the data, and
…nally in sections 4 and 5 we present results and conclusions respectively.
6See [1] [73] [30] [64] [47] [61] [22] [53] [51] for related issues on capital requirements and risk
taking.
42 The model
Assume a pro…t maximizing banking …rm subject to a number of technical and reg-
ulatory constraints. Further key assumptions are:
² the bank is risk neutral;
² projects to be …nanced are not divisible, this yields the result that a particular
borrower is …nanced or not, partial …nancing is not allowed
² each investment, !; generates a random end-of-period cash ‡ow of X with
density f(X;!), where ! is an index of risk of the project and hence borrower.7









where: Qi;i = r;f is the quantity of funds placed in either the risky …rm (r) or
the risk free asset (f); Ri;is the rate earned (charged) on these assets; KJ;J = F;B,
is the quantity of capital raised respectively by the borrower (F) and the banking
…rm (B); X is a random variable representing the terminal cash ‡ows of the borrower,
I represents the deposit rate; D the amount of deposits raised by the bank, T are
…xed transaction costs; and k is the cost of equity capital to the banking …rm.. The
risk free investment is assumed to exist always available to the banking …rm. In the
limit it may simply represent the reserves kept with the central bank earning a rate
of Rf ¸ 0: Like in all previous uses of this model, there is an implicit assumption
of a two-period model in which the bank contracts the funds from depositors at a
rate I, then turns around and decides on the portfolio allocation. The positions are
liquidated in the second period. Thus, the deposit rate I; is not made a function of
the portfolio allocation.9
7The parameter ! can also be considered to be the index of pessimism of Tybout [71] and Virmani
[72].
8Variants of this objective function were used in the development of the ”credit rationing” lit-
erature by Ja¤e and Modigliani [37], Stiglitz and Wise [66], Virmani [72], Guttentag and Herring
[32] and Tybout [71] among others. The reason for this choice of objective function is that, under
FR enterprises are subject to non-price credit rationing by the banking sector. When FL is intro-
duced, this form of credit rationing gives way to a new form of credit rationing that has been labeled
equilibrium credit rationing. The restrictions imposed by the state upon the banking system under
conditions of FR tend to modify the parameters of the non-price credit rationing allowing the state
to in‡uence directly the quantity and price of credit allocated to the real sector.
9This is a realistic assumption on the base of two considerations: i) depositors can only imperfectly
observe the porfolio allocation of the bank; ii) in the presence of explicit or conjectural deposit
insurance, the deposit rate will be insensitive to changes in the risk composition of the bank’s
portfolio. The situation is similar to the one assumed by Thakor and Beltz [69] where deposit
insurance renders the deposit rate riskless. The absence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme in
many of the countries that undergo FL does not invalidate the assumption. Experience has shown
that, for one reason or another, governments have allways felt compelled to honor a conjectural
deposit insurance out of …scal resources.
5In equation 1, the …rst term represents the cash ‡ows resulting from the loan in
case of borrowers insolvency; the second term represents the cash ‡ows from the loan
if the borrower remains solvent; QfRf are the cash ‡ows resulting from the risk-free
investment and all other terms represent costs (deposit, transactions, etc.)
This expression can be simpli…ed and represented in relative terms with respect
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Were qr = Qr=Qf is the ratio of risky investment (loan) to risk-free investment;
·B = KB=Qr represents the proportion of the loan …nanced with the bank’s own
equity; and so on. That is all lower case symbols are the same as those of equation
1 divided by Qr:
With respect to the risk characteristics of the borrowers, we say that a borrower







For convenience we adopt the de…nition of ”mean preserving risk ” of Rothschild
and Stiglitz [63] and will say that an increase in ! is a mean preserving risk increase
if the two following conditions are met:
Z 1
0
[dF(X;!)=d!]dX = 0 (4)
Z y
0
[dF(X;!)=d!]dX ¸ 0 for 0 · y · 1
After some algebra and integration by parts the objective function 2 can be rewrit-
ten10
Pb = Rr +
Rf
qr




where F(x;!) is the cumulative function. We assume further that 5 is restricted
by one or more of the following set of constraints:11
Rr · R¤ (6)




+ ½d ¡ (d + ·B) = 0 (8)




10The convexity of the objective function can be established by taking the …rst and second deriv-





11The third restriction results simply of dividing both sides of the equation:
QrRr + QfRf + ½D ¡ (D + KB) = 0
by Qr and substituting terms as in the objective function. In this equation the two …rst terms
represent risk and riskless assets, the third term, ½D, reserve requirements on deposits and the last
term represents liabilities (all deposits) and regulated net worth.
6These restrictions are at the center of our analysis and mark the di¤erence with
the situation modeled by Ja¤e and Modigliani [37] or others that followed (e.g. [66],
[72], [71]). In equations (6) to (9) the third constraint represents simply the bal-
ance sheet constraint, where ½ represents the reserves requirements with the Central
Bank. The …rst and second constraints represent two governments intervention that
are characteristic of …nancial repression (FR). Of these two constraints, the …rst sim-
ply says that the lending rates, Rr, cannot exceed the ceiling, R¤. The second is that
lending to a particular sector, presumably a ”priority sector ” or type of enterprise
must exceed a minimum proportion of total assets of Q¤. The goal of FL is usu-
ally to eliminate these two restrictions on the banks’ portfolio choice. Therefore, as
Galvis[23] 12 we take relaxation or lifting of controls on interest rates as the central
event of FL. The last constraint represents a minimum capital restriction. This re-
striction is often not present in FR regimes but is impose with FL, specially in recent
times when the capital requirement norms established by the Bank of International
Settlement became the generally accepted standard.13
We assume FR has been in place and therefore, the …rst and second constraints
were e¤ective.14 This is the only way that a FL process make political and economic
sense. If this would not be the case, the banking system would be operating under a
”de-facto ” liberalized environment. The latter was the situation found in the United
States during the early seventies. The existence of limits on lending and deposit
rates was (almost) completely ine¤ective as market rates were generally below rate
ceilings.. This was no longer case toward the end of the 1970’s and beginning of
the 1980’s when market rates started to exceed ceilings, leaving the United States
banking system operating under a FR regime. Thus, president Carter’s DIDMCA
(Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act) legislation of 1980
can be viewed as the ”…nancial liberalization ” legislation of the United States.15
There are speci…cally two areas that we will analyze in depth: the …rst is the
question of risk exposure of banks under FL; the second is the change in supply of
credit that can be expected following a FL.
12This author goes as far as stating ’FL is the elimination of FR, that is, increase of interest rates to
an e¢cient equilibrium level that promotes optimal saving rates and avoids misallocation of real and
…nancial resources.’ This type of FL is by far the most common situation for developing countries.
In contrast, the FL that accompanies the structural reforms of a former socialist economy in a much
more complex phenomena that goes beyond the scope of this paper.
13Somewhat similar problems, but using di¤erent models, have been analyzed by Humphrey and
Pulley [35], Lam and Chen [53], Mingo and Wolkowitz [56] among others, for the case of the United
States
14FL consists, of course, of more than relaxation of these two constraints. But this is just a stylized
representation of the FL process. However, as Galbis [23] and Chavez et al.[9] note, allowing market
forces determine interest rates and credit allocation is the center piece of a FL. For a reasonably
complete description of a FR regime and a review of the of the bundle of measures that make up a
typical FL program see the study by the Centro de Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos (CEMLA)
[7] and Chavez et al. [9]. Cortes-Douglas [14] also provides a very detailed description of the FL of
Chile.
15For studies that cover the e¤ect of DIDMCA on the banking sector see [12], [60], [2], [21], [50]
and [55] among others.
72.1 The risk of the banking …rm under …nancial liberalization
There are two ways in which a FL can a¤ect the risk exposure of the banking …rm
that we will consider here:
² by modifying the rates charged, Rr, once the restriction Rr · R¤ is eliminated.
² by switching the risk class, !;of borrowers.
There are indeed other ways in which FL can a¤ect bank risk. A very important
one is volatility of interest rates. As Chavez et al. [9] and Goldstein and Turner[31]
note, when interest rates are liberalized, banks loose the protection provided by
a regulated and stable term structure and intermediation margin. Volatility of
interest rates tends to increase, either permanently or at least during a reasonably
long transition period. This latter e¤ect will not be investigated here.
2.1.1 FL and interest rates
If FR has been in e¤ect then Rr = R¤ for at least some customers (the riskier ones).
Thus, FL implies the elimination of this restriction with an increase in at least some
of the previously regulated rates. For simplicity let us de…ne ¼ ´
R Rr¡·R
0 F(x;!)dX.
This term represents the risk component in the objective function. An increase in the









= F(Rr;!) ¸ 0 (10)
where F(Rr;!) represents the cumulative function at the point Rr (the probability
of insolvency at the interest rate Rr). This derivative is positive and less than one.
That is, the derivative is unambiguously non-negative and equal to zero only for a
riskless loan (F(Rf;!f) = 0). 16. In this context one should also remember Theorem
1 of Stiglitz and Weiss ([66], page 396) that clearly shows that higher interest rates
induce borrowers to undertake projects with lower probability of success but higher
payo¤ when successful.. This implies that as interest rates increase, the mixture of
projects that are being …nanced becomes worse. Jointly, this implies that the risk of
default increases for two reasons: i) the ability of borrowers to face interest payments;
and ii) the riskiness of the projects that are being …nanced by the borrowers.
2.1.2 Switching the risk class, !;of borrowers
Banking deregulation processes are more often than not, part of a market oriented
reform package for the economy and the …nancial system.. This can a¤ect consid-
erably the environment under which the real sector (the customers of the banks)
16The increase in real interest rates has been described as ”extravagant ” by Diaz-Alejandro [16],
As examples consider the following cases: in the case of Chile these rates reached an average of
32% over the period 1976-82; in Peru, by September 1990, two months after the de-facto ‡oating of
interest rates, average real bank lending rates in domestic currency were 17% per month. A similar
phenomena was observed in practically all FL in Latin-America..
8operates including: terms of trade, real exchange rates, economic activity, etc.17 In
fact, often-times FL packages are preceded or accompanied by economic packages
that seek to contract consumption and demand.. Further, liberalization of the …nan-
cial sector may change the customer basis of the banks with larger and better known
…rms rasing a larger share of funding through securitized markets. The resulting
e¤ect on the banking sector is generally a deterioration of the risk composition of the
bank portfolio. Assume that the change in ! is a mean preserving change in risk that







[@F(x;!)=@!]dX · 0 (11)
(the opposite is true for the enterprise). That is, any deterioration in the credit
risk of the customer increases the insolvency probability of the …rm and thus the risk
structure of the bank’s portfolio. This e¤ect is beyond the control of bank managers.
We see then, that bank portfolio risk is likely to increase under …nancial liberal-
ization as a result of two concurrent e¤ects that are largely beyond control of bank
managers: increase in interest rates and increase in the underlying risk of the clients’
cash ‡ows.
2.1.3 Bank risk taking behavior and moral hazard
But what happens to new projects that are …nanced after FL? The bank, in this case,
has full control of the risk exposure that it assumes when …nancing a new project or
re…nance old ones. Under conditions of FL they are free to set the rates charged to
borrowers and, presumably, will adjust the same to the riskiness of the underlying
project. As shown, it is evident that an increase in Rr will result in an increase in
the probability of client insolvency. However, what is the e¤ect of such an increase
on the whole objective function of the banking …rm and which could be considered
a rational response on the side of the banker? This can easily be seen from the FOC
17It is quite common for FL to be part of a package of reforms that eliminate restrictions and
protections on the economy as a whole. Most likely, the FL will be accompanied by commercial
policies of free trade that leaves local business exposed to international competition. The e¤ect of
these measures on business risk can be quite variable depending upon the competitiveness vis-à-vis
the rest of the world. However naive one may appraise the e¤ect of such policies, it is clear that
substantial portions of the domestic business sector will see deep changes in the markets they serve,
and many will invariably fail to adapt. One simple but dramatic example is the case of the toy
industry in Argentina. Between 1991 and 1996 the share of imports in the toys market passed from
6% to 80%. One result was that 170 toy manufacturers, out of approximately 200 that were in
operation in 1991, either went bankrupt or were forced to close toy manufacturing plants over this
…ve-years span (”Papa Noel viene de China”, Clarin, 16 December 1996, pp.1). The issue of domestic
macroeconomic volatility associated with …nancial liberalization has been addressed in a more or less
direct way by several authors. See [31], [18], [9],[41],[38] among others for a more detailed treatment
of these links. It is also interesting to note that in e.g. the case of the Southern Cone, FL was
followed by a drop in GNP 11% in Argentina, 15% in Chile and 14% in Uruguay. Such dramatic
e¤ects on the real economy of FL are bound to in‡uence considerably the riskiness of bank clients.
9of equation (5) (subject to restrictions 6 to 9) that
@P
@Rr
= 1 ¡ F(x;!) (12)
This FOC is unambiguously positive since F(x;!) · 1. Thus, banks will be
encouraged to pro…t from the new-found freedom for setting interest rates as long




= ¡F! + R!FR (13)
where RJ and FJ represent derivatives with respect to the variable in the sub-
script. From equation (13) it is evident not only that for this derivative to be negative,
it must be that F! > R!FR. If the increase in interest rate that the bank is able
to charge to the borrower is more than proportional than the increase in risk, then
R! > 1:0 and then F! must be larger than FR by a factor of R! before the bank will
be restrained from taking additional risk. A R! > 1:0 is, by no means, an unlikely
situation under conditions of FL where it is not unusual to observe massive increases
in lending rates.19
18In fact, a very careful study performed by the IMF on …ve FL processes (Argentina, 1976-81;
Chile, 1974-80; Indonesia, 1983-88; Korea, 1980-88 and Philippines, 1980-81) and reported by John-
ston [38] is quite revealing. In all cases not only did interest rates increase following FL, but the
gross intermediation margins also increased despite decreases in reserve requirements. If the facts
are of interest, the justi…cation that follows is arguable. According to this author, elimination of
interest rates and credit controls ”enables ”banks to perform a better credit risk assessment. If any-
thing, performing risk assessment becomes more di¢cult following FL and macroeconomic reforms.
Further, under FR, credit rationing can easily and e¤ectively be implemented to maintain only the
best quality borrowers in the portfolio. Given the controls on interest rates there is little incentive
to lend to more risky borrowers. When controls are eliminated and the risk/return trade-o¤ of loans
can be exploited by banks, e¢cient risk assessment becomes critical, however di¢cult it may be
in the new environment. The propositions that follows these observations made by Johnston [38],
although perfectly in line with traditional thinking, could turn out to be dangerous!. To reduce cost
to …nancial intermediaries (and thus intermediation margin) reserve requirements should be reduced
drastically. Following this recommendation means also than an important cushion against ‡uctua-
tions in asset values (and thus bank solvency) es being removed. Beyond a reasonable reduction of
reserve requirements to above international standards, unless further reductions are accompanied by
a commensurate increase in capital requirements (about which little is said), the risk of a banking
crisis is being increased considerably.
19This phenomena was particularly evident in the Mexican case. There, following FL expansion of
credit to the private sector was mainly channeled to the more pro…table, and under the circumstances
risky, segments of the market such as …nancing of durable consumer goods, mortgages and credit
cards. See [25] for a detailled description of the Mexican case. By large majority, FL processes have
been implemented either without an increase in prudential supervision or even by a relaxation of
supervision practices. This has often led to dramatic increases in risk taking following FL. Examples
of this risk taking in South America are described in rich details by Diaz-Alejandro [16] and Corbo
et all. [13]. Diaz-Alejandro also describes how the FL processes have attracted new business people
into the banking sector and encouraged the formation of banking-industrial conglomerates. These
new business owners where rather inclined to take large amounts of risk in a sector where, experience
has over and over again shown, the threat of bankruptcy is not credible. The conglomerates, on
their part, encouraged large bank exposures in a¢liated companies. For example, toward the end of
10But, is this ”moral hazard”? By formulation, the model …xes deposit rates to I.
Thus, by de…nition this rates are not sensitive to changes in the risk of the bank’s
loan portfolio. Presumably, if this variable would be set as a function I = I[f(X;!)],
then one should expect that @I=@! 1 0 and the solution of the problem would
presumably be di¤erent. Most likely, this would have a restraining e¤ect on the
risk taking incentives of the bank. In a game-theoretic framework this would mean
that the bank and depositors agree on a contract (the deposit) at price I, but then
the bank takes an action (increasing risk) that by assumption is unobserved to the
depositor. Thus, the incentive to increase risk taking by the bank just identi…ed falls
squarely under the de…nition of moral hazard with hidden information that has come
to be accepted in the literature (see for example [62], pp133-136).20. In Guttentag
and Herring [32], Stiglitz and Weiss [66] and Keeton [49] moral hazard also plays
a role but a di¤erent one. In these authors’ models, moral hazard, de…ned by the
con‡ict between the bank and the borrower makes, is the crucial feature that leads
to equilibrium credit rationing.
If liberalization in the banking sector is part of a larger process of deregulation
of …nancial markets, the process may be accompanied by capital in‡ows. These
in‡ows, if not sterilized , boost bank deposits, bank liquidity, and tempt banks to
increase lending as predicted by standard FL theory.21 If a lending boom ensues, it is
likely to be accomplished by an aggressive lending policy that accepts a larger-than-
usual level of risk taking in the loan portfolio. Rapid rates of credit expansion have
sometimes paradoxically coincided with high real interest rates in the wake of FL.
This further enhances the risk associated to the lending boom.22 Lending booms,
1982, several Chilean banks had lend over one fourth of their resources to a¢liated companies [16].
This companies, at the same time, displayed a leverage that was high in historical terms. Cortes-
Douglas [14] describes management practices by Chilean bank owners during the 1975-1982 period
that limited in the reckless and illegal. It is tempting to draw some paralels with the Mexican FL
process that started in 1988-89.
20This form of moral hazard is di¤erent from that resulting of the existence of guarantees on the
deposits of the bank, whether conjectural government guarantees or an explicit deposit insurance
scheme, with insurance premiums that are not tied to the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio.
With respect to this form of moral hazard, it has been shown that when one ignores charter value
considerations, option theory suggests that bank owners are unambiguously encouraged to increase
risk exposure in the loan portfolio. Keeley [48] and Marcus [55], on the other hand, show that when
potential losses in charter values are included in the analysis, bankers incentive to increase loan
portfolio risk is not unlimited, a result similar to the one obtained in the current analysis.
21For example, net in‡ows in the capital account roughly doubled (as a share of host-country GDP)
from 1984-88 to 1989-93, the period of FL in some countries (e.g. Malaysia and Thailand) ([40]).
On the other hand, banks may not just be passive recipients of capital in‡ows over which they have
no control. In fact, they may pro…t from the deregulation environment by actively seeking funds in
international …nancial markets at a cost well below domestic interest rates. This is a way to increase
the pro…t of lending operations by reducing the cost of borrowing which is possible in international
…nancial markets. This operations, while increasing the pro…t margin of lending operations also
increase risk of banking operations by augmenting the ”currency gap ” in the bank’s balance sheet.
This form of moral hazard was extensively used by banks in Chile and Mexico following FL. Diaz-
Alejandro [16] reports that in the case of Chile, the majority of capital in‡ows to the country following
FL was in form of debt to …nancial and non-…nancial business enterprises. In both cases the exposure
contributed considerably to the ulterior failure of the banks.
22See Goldstein and Turner [31], Fry [20], Kaminsky and Reinhart [41] and Galbis [24] for examples
11just as shifting to more pro…table portfolios, results in conscious increase in ! by
bank owners, contributing to the fragility of the banks.
2.1.4 Deposit insurance as an additional source of moral hazard
The form of moral hazard argued above is di¤erent from that resulting of the existence
of guarantees on the deposits of the bank, whether conjectural government guarantees
or an explicit deposit insurance scheme, with insurance premiums that are not tied to
the riskiness of the bank’s loan portfolio. With respect to this form of moral hazard,
it has been shown that when one ignores charter value considerations, option theory
suggests that bank owners are unambiguously encouraged to increase risk exposure
in the loan portfolio.23 Keeley [48] and Marcus [55], on the other hand, show that
when potential losses in charter values are included in the analysis, bankers incentive
to increase loan portfolio risk is not unlimited, a result similar to the one obtained in
the current analysis. This latter form of moral hazard is not explicitly modeled here.
However it is possible to speculate what the e¤ect of FL could be on the value of the
put option for bank owners, and thus on the incentives to engage in moral hazard.
As we have seen, the model yields unambiguously an increase in the level of risk of
the banks porfolio and, under quite plausible conditions, an incentive to increase the
risk of the portolio by …nancing riskier projects up to a point where credit rationing set
is. The immediate consequence of these combined e¤fects is to increase the conditional
variance of the banks assets. This increase in variance will, in turn, enhance the value
of the put option available to bank shareholders. The overal result is that the presence
of a explicit or implict deposit insurance scheme is likely to accentuate the incentives
to engage in risk and the risk structure of the banking system.
2.2 The supply of credit
Another issue of crucial importance in a context of FL is that of the change in
supply of credit to the business sector following the liberalization. To a large extent,
the purpose of eliminating FR is to eliminate distortions in the supply of credit to
business24 and, most of all, increase the global amount of credit available in the
economy by augmenting the savings rate. However, as we will show below, this in by
no means and unambiguous result. Diaz-Alejandro[16] already observed in the case
of the ”southern cone ” (Argentina, Chile, Uruguay), that the FL of the late 1970’s
did not stimulate intermediation beyond a small increase in short-term assets.25
of this phenomenon. Unfortunately, these lending booms are not of the type one could qualify as
”desirable.” In the Mexican case, a very subtantial portion of the credit expansion that followed the
FL/privatization was in the form of consumer loans while credit to the productive sector was kept
very tight.. The high default rate of these consumer loans contributed substantially to the banking
crisis of 1995-97.
23See specially Kaen [42], [44] for a comprehensive treatment of the issue in the United States
context.
24One of the distortions of FR that is of most concern to economists, is the transfer of wealth from
savers to large business owners (Fry, [20])
25In Chile,at the peak of growth in …nancial intermediation that followed FL, the growth in bank
liabilities was limited to six month deposits. Further, although the use of alternative savings instru-
12The loan o¤er function of the bank under conditions of FL can be obtained from
the FOC of the Lagrangian. More speci…cally by investigating the e¤ect of a marginal
change in loan quantity restriction, Q¤, associated with a marginal change in lending
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Clearly, the sign of this expression is ambiguous and a function of the absolute
value of shadow prices of the FR restrictions, the risk free rate, the amount of loan
already outstanding and the bankruptcy probability of the borrower. These shadow
prices are, in turn, complex functions of dr;·B;Rf;½ and Rr. Even in the simple
case that FR does not exist (and thus ¸1 and ¸2 are zero), a change in the quantity















with ambiguous sign. It will be negative if
F(Rr(!) ¡ ·f;!) + ¸3 < 1:0 (16)
and positive otherwise.
As predicted by traditional FL economists, other thing equal, a reduction in
reserve requirements is likely to reduce the lending rates charged by banks. This can








1 ¡ F(Rr(!) ¡ ·f;!) ¡ ¸3
which will be negative if
1 ¡ F(Rr(!) ¡ ·f;!) ¡ ¸3 < 0:
To get a better idea of what is happening in equation (14) we will use a graphical
approach. Note that the graph is used only to illustrate the mathematical results.
The ambiguity we will illustrated …nds its support in the results of equations (14)
and (15).
ments increased substantially [3], paradoxically the total domestic savings did not increase in the
Southern Cone experiments of the 1970-80. In the case of Chile, it actually fell from 16.3 from the
early 1970’s to 12.4% in the 1975-81 period. Most of the increase in …nancial liabilities was due to the
increase in foreign capital in‡ows. Domestic investment was also not up to expectations suggested
by FL literature. In Chile, like domestic savings, it fell from 20.2% to 15.5%. It is possible that this
drop was more due to policies that accompanied the FL than to the process itself. However, in all
three cases the ”package ” (FL plus structural adjustments) was typical of a FL environment.
13Figure 1:
The shape of the loan supply and demand functions are well known following the
works of Ja¤ee and Modigliani [37] and Stiglitz and Weiss [66]. Under FR the shape of
this function is modi…ed to satisfy restrictions 6 and 7. The resulting supply function
has been used by Cebenoyan et all. [6] to analyze problems of capital structure under
FR. We present it in Figure 1. The horizontal axe represents interest rates (R) and
the verticals axe quantity (size of loan,Q). The loan supply function under FR, SFR;
is drawn as a bold continuous line . This loan supply function re‡ects the fact that
banks are forced to supply funds to enterprises up to Q¤at interest rates that cannot
exceed the ceiling, R¤. In the situation depicted in Figure 1 all three entrepreneurs
demanding funds, originating in three di¤erent risk classes, !, will obtain these at
the respective intercepts of their demand functions, Dj;j = 1;::;3. As in earlier
credit rationing models, the demand functions represent a measure of the interest
rates the borrower is willing to pay and thus acting as a screening device.26 In
the case presented the intercept of the demand and supply functions are all in the
upward sloping portion of the supply function. Thus in the cases illustrated, no credit
rationing exists.27
The credit supply function under a liberalized regime, SFL, presented in Figure
1 as a broken line, represents a very simple situation. Overall, the elimination of
restriction on rates and quantity has restored the classical supply function of Ja¤ee
and Modigliani [37] and Stiglitz and Weiss [66] where equilibrium credit rationing
exists due to imperfect information. We assumed here that only a trivial shift of the
supply function occurred related to an increase in deposit rates from I to I0. This
shift to the right re‡ects the overall increase in interest rates (deposit and lending)
in the economy. It is clear in this situation that customers of all risk classes receive
26See Stiglitz and Weiss [66] for details about interest rates as screening devices in the context of
credit rationing models.
27Credit rationing is perfectly possible in this situation. This would occur if the demand function
passes above the ‡oor of Q
¤.
14lesser funds at higher rates, with customers of risk class 3 being cut o¤ completely.
It is possible to conceive much more complex shifts including shift in the Northeast
direction, a lending boom that would increase overall supply of funds at higher rates
(with a corresponding increase in overall risk for the bank as new, riskier customers
are accepted) or a Southeast shift toward lower supply of funds at higher rates.
We will not present these cases as the purpose of this graphical exercise is only to
illustrate the ambiguity in the change in supply of funds that can accompany a FL
process. The simple case presented in Figure 1 illustrates this point amply. In fact,
increased supply at lower rates (a result that should supposedly follow FL in the
classical literature) would consist of a shift of the supply function to the NW, a most
unlikely situation.
This result contradicts the established intuition that FL, and in particular liberal-
ization of interest rates with elimination of credit controls, will result in an unambigu-
ous increase in credit (see e.g. Johnston [38]). With the elimination of credit controls
and excessive demand for credit, so the argument goes, bank respond to the excess
demand by expanding credit at an accelerated rate.28 Our result suggests, instead,
that following the FL event, a credit crunch may occur, even if in the long term the
established believe holds. This will occur if the incentive for credit contraction in
the short term is larger that the increase in supply of funds to the system by savers
that will, presumably, be channelled to …nancing the real sector. A crucial variable
for this to happen or not, is the strength of the …nancial position of the non-…nancial
sector when the FL occurs.29
3 Statistical Methodology
We test the results of the theoretical analysis with a statistical model similar to
the one used by Schranz [65]. This author analyzes the e¤ect of bank mergers and
takeovers on the performance of a sample of United States based banks. The setting
is certainly quite di¤erent, however the methodology used is perfectly applicable to
the problem at hand. To test the hypothesis resulting from our predictions we build
a model of three equations. This model relates three variables pro…tability, risk and
liquidity to a dummy variable representing the FL event and a set of control variables.
The variable ”liquidity” is a reverse measure of the level of performance in terms of
intermediation. A high liquidity ratio supports the hypothesis that banks tend to
restrain their lending activities and place a larger portion of assets in the form of
liquid assets such as marketable securities and government bonds. The reason we
include a set of control variables in the regression is that the three variables under
investigation depend on a number of factors besides the FL event.
The statistical model used can be described as follows:
28This argument is at the root of the optimal sequencing proposition that credit expansion should
not be totally decontrolled in the initial stages following FL, or alternatively, …nancial resources in
the economy should be increased by …scal contraction and external borrowing.
29A similar result was obtained recently by Isard et al. [36] in the context of a multiperiod general
equilibrium framework.






















² PROFv pro…tability measure
² RISKv risk measure
² LIQv liquidity (intermediation) measure
² CTRYj is a country dummy (Greece was taken as the intercept)
² CONTRvi control variable i;j; a di¤erent subset for each dependent variable
The CONTRvi variables were selected using a stepwise elimination procedure for
each individual equation out of a list of about 20 candidate ratios/variables. This
procedure used an F ¡statistic as the criteria of selection of the variables that would
be eliminated. The signi…cance level used for the selection process was 0.15. For each
of the dependent variables we used several candidates based on book and market
value. The variables for concentration (CONC) and growth (GTA) were forced into
the equation. The liberalization dummy, LIBD, changed the value from zero to one
at the dates indicated in Table 1 in the following section.
As measure of intermediation, LIQv; we will use the ratio of loans to deposits.
Admitedly, this measure is only partially a measure of the …nancing supplied by the
banking sector to the economy. The reason is that it only re‡ects the internal shift
in portfolio allocation by the banking sector and does not take into consideration the
overall growth in …nancial liabilities in the economy. A further distortion is introduced
by the fact that the data does not allow us to di¤erentiate between commercial and
consumer loan. For this reason, the variable only measures that incentives to which
banks are subject in terms of portfolio allocation between loans and other banking
assets..
The measure of risk, RISKv; used throughout the statistical analysis were the
conditional variance of stock market returns and the net interest revenues over earn-
ing assets. The conditional variance was computed exploiting the heteroschedastic
properties of stock return series. To do this we used a conditional moment a model
that has become quite standard in the …nance literature seeking to measure stock
price volatility:
E[rjt j -t¡1] = a + brjt¡1 + cht + "t
16where -t¡1 represents the set of conditioning variables, not including rjt but contain-
ing its past history, and where ht represents the conditional variance at time t. That
is, the return on the stock, conditional upon the information set -t¡1 is equal to an
expected value plus a random error. See Nelson 1991], Hsieh [1993] and Glosten, Ja-
gannathan and Runkle (GJR) [1993] for theoretical supports of this choice of model.
The error, "t, can be assumed to be conditional on the same information set, -t¡1,
and normally distributed, i.e.("t j -t¡1) » N(0;t ), or ("t j -t¡1) » t(0;ht;º). We
choose to give this conditional variance an EGARCH (exponential generalized au-
toregressive conditional heteroscedastic) parametrization. The complete model can
thus be written as follows:
rjt = b0 + b1rjt¡1 + b2ht¡1 + b3LIB + "t (18)
("t j -t¡1) » t(0;ht;º) if º ¸ 30
("t j -t¡1) » N(0;ht) otherwise
ln(ht) = ® + ±1LIB + ¯ ln(ht) + µg("t¡1)
g("t¡1) =
Ã¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
"t p
ht








We augmented both the conditional mean and conditional variance equations of
the conventional EGARCH model to incorporate a dummy variables for …nancial
liberalization (LIB). The t-tests on the coe¢cients b3, ±1 are tests on the hypothesis
that FL a¤ects the level and volatility of bank stock returns. The parameters of the
system were estimated using a FIML estimation procedure assuming (and testing) a
t-distributed vector of errors. A t-test on the statistic representing degrees of freedom
on the t-distribution is a su¢cient statistic to test the restriction that the distribution
is normal. When the estimates of º where large (>30) and non signi…cant, errors
were assumed to be distributed normal. An alternate speci…cation, a GARCH-M
with leverage (e.g. GJR [1993]) was also tested. This latter model was di¢cult to
estimate and sensitive to initial values of the coe¢cients. Further, the coe¢cients were
often outside of their expected range. Thus we continued working with the EGARCH
model despite the critic of Engle and Ng [1993]. We test the implicit assumption of
heteroscedasticity in bank stock returns using a Gauss-Newton regression.
4 Data
The empirical analysis was performed on annual observations of accounting data
for a sample of banks originating in …ve countries that have been exposed to a FL
event and for which reasonably ”good” detailed …nancial information at the level of
individual banks was available over the relevant period. In table 1 we present the
countries, the dates of FL, the number of banks in the sample of each country and the
period covered (years for which data was available). The sample does not su¤er of
survival bias because we included all banks available, whether or not they eventually
disappeared by liquidation, merger or acquisition. The portion of the analysis that
17uses market data (computation of conditional risk) was performed using monthly
observations of the banks’ stock.
Table 1
Country Date of FL # of banks Period
Greece February 1987 8 1984-93
Malaysia February 1991 8 1976-93
Mexico November 198830 16 1982-94
Taiwan March 1985 18 1975-93
Thailand March 1990 16 1975-93
Total 73
The source of the data is the following: for Greece data was obtained from
DISCLOSURE; for Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand we obtained the data from the
PACAP (Paci…c Basin Capital Markets) database; and for Mexico we used account-
ing data from the Mexican Superintendencia de Bancos and market data obtained
from the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.
5 Results
The model was estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) technique.
The main interest of the study is on the link between FL and the three key dependent
variables: pro…tability, risk and intermediation e¢ciency. Thus we focus on the LIBD
coe¢cient of each equation. We ran two simultaneous equations models, the …rst
using the conditional variance and the second the net interest earnings over earning
assets as proxy of risk. The …rst system provided results that were statistically
superior to the second. In particular, for the second system the Durbin-Watson
statistic for the pro…tability equation was such that we could not reject the hypothesis
of presence of autocorrelation in the sample.31 Thus, although the results are very
similar for both systems, we report only the results for the system that uses the
conditional variance of stock returns as proxy of risk. From table 2 it can be seen
that the presence of autocorrelation is rejected for the RISKv and the LIQv but
is less certain for the PROFv despite the fact that the variable was lagged for two
periods.32
The most notable results are: pro…tability falls following FL with a signi…cance
level of 3%!; risk of banks measured by the conditional variance of stock returns
increases with FL with a signi…cance level of at the 2% level; …nally the measure of
supply of funds falls with a signi…cance level of less than 1%. This empirical result is
consistent with the two main theoretical propositions that FL consistently increases
the instability of the banking system and that the sign of the change in supply of
31The dl and du at the signi…cance level of 1% for a system with over 100 observations and 3
independent variables are 1.48 and 1.60 respectively.
32In the process of lagging we lost almost 40 observations bringing the total number of usable
observations down from 456 to 417. However, the introduction of the lags improved the DW for the
equation from 1.25 to the current 1.48, just on the lower limit, du.
18funds may not be that suggested by traditional FL literature. In fact for the sample
investigated the proportion of available funds placed in the real sector falls. This
means that if FL does not produce an a signi…cant expansion of …nancial assets in
the economy to compensate for the shift in portfolio allocation, a credit crunch may
result.33 A detail of some interest is the fact that while there is little of no di¤erence
between the risk measure of Greece banks and the banks of the other countries (t-
statistics are not signi…cant with the exception of Thailand), the same is not true for
the other variables where important di¤erences appear to exist between countries. In
Table 2 we present detailed results for the estimation of system (17) for each of the
countries in the sample.
We do not report the results of estimating equation (18) since one model was
estimated for each bank in the sample (i.e. 73 times). These estimation were based
on monthly observations of bank stock returns. Then we extracted the value of the
estimated conditional variance at the end of each year for which accounting data was
available.
6 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper explores theoretically and empirically the link between Financial Liber-
alization (FL) and the banking crisis that often follow. We also investigate theoreti-
cally and empirically, the proposition that FL should result in an increase in supply
of funds to the real sector. To accomplish this we …rst develop a theoretical model
of a banking …rm that operates under …nancial repression and is then subject to FL.
The model yields the result that following FL there is an unambiguous increase in
risk to the banking …rm. This increase implies a higher probability of a banking crisis
following FL. Less formally, we also conclude that the presence of a explicit or implict
deposit insurance scheme is likely to accentuate the incentives to engage in risk and
the risk structure of the banking system. Moral hazard plays an important role in
this increase in risk to the banking sector. This questions the ”innocence” of the
bank owners in the crisis that have often followed FL and that had been attributed
to either macroeconomic policy, concomitant structural changes in the economy or
left-over distortions from the …nancial repression period. The sign of the change in
supply of credit to the real sector is ambiguous.Our result suggests, instead, that fol-
lowing the FL event, a credit crunch may occur. This will be the case if the incentive
for credit contraction in the short term is larger that the increase in supply of funds
to the system by savers that will, presumably, be channelled to …nancing the real
sector. A crucial variable for this to happen or not, is the strength of the …nancial
position of the non-…nancial sector at the moment of the FL event.
We test empirically the propositions resulting from this model using data of a
sample of 73 banks (some of which may have become technically insolvent) from
33Note once again the reported fact that, ”paradoxically” the total domestic savings did not
increase in the Southern Cone experiments of the 1970-80. In the case of Chile, it actually fell from
16.3 from the early 1970’s to 12.4% in the 1975-81 period. Most of the increase in …nancial liabilities
was due to the increase in foreign capital in‡ows.
19Greece, Malaysia, Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand. The empirical test was based on a
system of three simultaneous equations that use a measure of risk, pro…tability and
intermediation as dependent variables. The measure of risk used was the conditional
variance estimated using an empirical conditional Capital Asset Pricing Model esti-
mated using an EGARCH speci…cation. The test tend to support the conclusions
of the theoretical model, i.e. unambiguous increase in risk and for the sample, an
unambiguous fall in credit supply to the real sector as proportion of total portfolio
allocation by banks.
6.1 Policy implications
If FL exposes banks to increased risk and even encourages more risk taking, then
obviously the probability of failures occurring after FL increases accordingly. Only
those banks that operate prudently supported by an appropriate risk management
and capital base will be able to survive in the new environment. This has implication
with respect to bank supervision in the transition period, forbearance and bank failure
resolution procedures,34 the conditions that must exist before undertaking FL and
about the so-called liberalization sequencing. The policy implications we draw with
respect to these issues are the following:
² Governments wanting to implement FL should be clear that, by doing so, the
likelihood of bank insolvencies and even a system-wide crisis is automatically
increased. Thus they should prepare for it by establishing a failure resolution
procedures that is credible and timely, where both banks and supervisors are
given clear guideline under what conditions banks should be restructured or
liquidated.35 This is absolutely essential to prevent the expansion of likely in-
dividual bank insolvencies into a system wide crisis with a huge cost to the
taxpayers. This expansion can happen easily when excessive forbearance en-
courages increasingly risky behavior by near-insolvent banks and provides a
wrong signal to solvent banks. This resolution policy should also include clear
provision for the funding of failure resolution expenses that are likely to occur.
This may or may not consist of an explicit deposit insurance scheme/fund …-
nanced by the banking system itself. This is essential to prevent negative …scal
impacts (sometimes of massive proportions) such as those that have occurred in
34The experience of the United States, following the FL of 1980 and the property and energy
booms of the 1980’s, points clearly to the fact that excessive forebearance on the side of banking
authorities (supervision, deposit insurer and Central Bank as lender of last resort) can whorsen
rapidly the conditions in the banking system.See [58] [26] [39] [57] [27] [17] [28] [46] [52] [11] [29]
and [19] for various aspects of the forebearance issue. Interestingly, the forebearance issue became
a topic of particular interest to United States regulators only after the S&L debacle that followed
the DIDMCA reform. This would suggest that forebearance is a problem that takes a particularly
important place in the contect of a system wide crisis.
35The issue being raised here is a complex one. Not only the banks are subject to incentives,
but also the bank supervisors. In e¤ect, as proposed by Kane [43] and tested by Thomson [70],
delayed closure of inolvent banks is a function of the incentive system facing the bank regulators.
Thus, regulators thermselves must be given clearcut intervention rules (incentive compatible bank
regulation) to prevent self-interest harmful forebearance.
20Mexico (1995-96), Venezuela (1995-96), Chile (1980-84) and Argentina (1979-
83), among others.
² The results also suggest that it is essential that …nancial liberalization be ac-
companied by a strengthening of the supervision and monitoring of the banking
system. In particular, the supervision and monitoring authorities should have
in place a stringent system of identi…cation of failure prone banks. In fact, this
increase in supervision capacity should, if possible, precede initiation of the FL
process.
² Some of the propositions of the traditional FL-sequencing literature should be
reviewed or the caveats made clear. One example is the proposition of reducing
reserves requirements in the face of increasing lending rates (to stop the raise).
This action, while possibly having the desired e¤ect, is also likely to increases
the insolvency risk of the banks by sliming down a cushion for asset value ‡uc-
tuations. This policy of reduced reserves requirements should be implemented
only if appropriate capital standards are in place.36 FL-sequencing should
be modi…ed to take into consideration several of the elements incorporated in
the previous points including: failure resolution policies, resolution expenses
…nancing, implementation of extra-situ and in-situ early warning system, etc.
² Policy makers should not expect that FL will necessarily fuel an economic
expansion by increasing the supply of credit to the real sector. In fact, the
contrary may occur in the short run, as the banks may be subject to incen-
tives to contract credit to its costumers following FL, and thereby, contributing
to a contraction in economic activity. This result is supported by both the
theoretical model and the empirical test.
² Authorities facing a banking system that has serious solvency problems may be
tempted to liberalize the system with the hope that, given a freer operating en-
vironment, banks may grow in strength. This is a wrong reason for liberalizing
the banking sector, since this liberalization will only exacerbate fragility and
the probability of a system-wide crisis. The solvency of the banking system can
be controlled much easily under …nancial repression where risk taking is much
easily and automatically discouraged (via controls on interest rates). This does
not imply that FL should not be eventually be undertaken to encourage the
development of the banking and …nancial sector as a whole.
36Reserve requirements should also be viewed as the safety system for sound banking. In fact,
capital and reserves should be su¢cient to support the risk that arises from the banks lending
activity. In other words capital and reserves are two sides of the same coin when it comes to
bank safety. In this latter sense see the recently BIS-released Core Principles for E¤ective Banking
Supervision (CPEBS) [59]. It should be remebered that the Mexico banking crisis happened with BIS
capital standards in place. This means that, as Kane [45] noted, ”adequate capital” does not mean
BIS-standards, in fact it may mean much higher capital requirements. The recommendations of the
CPEBS go in the same direction: ”Each country should...supplement these standards with additional
requirements to address particular risks and general conditions prevailing in its own market” ([59],
pp.10).
21Overall, it appears that it is a bad idea to implement FL as a quick remedy
to either problems in the banking system or as a means to rapidly fuel economic
growth. In both cases FL may actually back…re yielding the contrary e¤ect and thus
complicating the problem. In both cases, if FR is in place, it is often tempting to
undertake a FL because it easy to implement, often through a few government decrees
or Central Banks directives. Further, it provides voters and international agencies
a sense that ”something is being done” in terms of reforms. Rather, FL should be
undertaken after careful preparation and most of all establishment of an e¤ective
and capable bank supervision body that it is also armed with clear and timely bank
failure resolution procedures. They will, very likely, be called upon to be put to good
use. As the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision [59] noted, ”while the cost
of banking supervision is indeed high, the cost of poor supervision has proved to be
even higher.”
22Table 2: Statistical Test of Bank Performance under Financial
Liberalization
The statistical model used can be described as follows:





















where PROFv pro…tability measure; RISKv risk measure; LIQv liquidity (intermediation)
measure; CONTRvi control variable i;j. The CONTRvi variables were selected using a stepwise
elimination procedure for each individual equation and for each of the …ve countries used in the
empirical analysis. The liberalization dummy, LIBD, changed the value from zero to one at the
dates indicated in Table 1. The measure of risk, RISKv; used throughout the statistical analysis
was the conditional variance of stock market returns. This variance was computed exploiting the

























Lagged dep.var. 1 lag
2 lags
Consolidated Sample of 5 Countries
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PROFv (NP/SC) RISKv (CV) LIQv (TL/TD)
1.482 (0.73) 1.651 (0.01) 1.818 (0.86)
-0.0186 (-2.169) 1.057 (2.319)c -0,0465 (-2.808)c
0.1344 (5.623) 0.8817 (0.718) -01265 (-2.582)
0.0825 (2.955) 1.2584 (0.946) -0.0089 (-0.164)
0.1418 (7.400) 0.6517 (0.658) -0.1617 (-3.948)
0.0598 (2.638) 1.7758 (1.780) -0.1167 (-2.617)
–
0.7506 (15.564) -28.02 (-1.587)
– -1.702 (-1.638)
-0.0105 (1.866) 0.466 (0.144) 0.156 (1.312)
0.029 (29.66)
-0.200 (-0.495)
-0.1701 (-4.340) 0.2495 (4.666)
0.1938 (4.176) -0.6447 (-11.514)
0.4561 (14.05)
0.353 (5.143) 3.434 (1.016) -0.179 (-1.341)
0.154 (2.463) -0.247 (-2.867)
-1.308 (-13.687) 0.496 (4.141)
0.009 (11.43) -0.018 (-22.39)
-0.011 (-11.96) 0.025 (59.16)
0.0023 (0.208) -0.0587 (-0.085) 0.0011 (0.0459)
-0.0153 (-2.908) 0.3909 (1.652) 0.0000 (0.204)
0.0960 (3.001)
0.0582 (1.889)
# The symbols used in this table stand for: LIB the FL dummy, NP/SC net
pro…ts over shareholder capital, OP/TA operating pro…t over total assets, NP/TA
net pro…t over total assets, NPM net pro…t margin, CV conditional variance on the
stock price, NIE/IEA net interest earnings over interest earning assets, TL/TA total
lending over total assets, LA/TA liquid assets over total assets, TL/TD total lending
over total deposits, IE/IR interest expenses over interest revenues, IE/TA interest
expenses over total assets, SC/TA shareholder capital over total assets, TD/SC total
deposits over shareholder capital, TL/SC total lending over shareholders capital,
GTA growth in total assets, CONC market concentration.
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